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1. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998).  As
used in this Comment, the term “multijurisdictional practice,” or “MJP,” refers to legal work performed by
a lawyer in any jurisdiction in which that lawyer is not admitted to practice law.  See AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, CLIENT REPRESENTATION IN THE 21ST
CENTURY:  REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE 2 (2002) [hereinafter MJP
REPORT].
2. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 3, 13.
3. Id. at 5.  The court explained:
In our view, the practice of law “in California” entails sufficient contact with the California client
to render the nature of the legal service a clear legal representation. . . . Our definition does not
necessarily depend on or require the unlicensed lawyer’s physical presence in the state. . . . For
example, one may practice law in the state . . . although not physically present here by advising a
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INTRODUCTION
It has been over seven years since the California Supreme Court thrust the
thorny issues associated with multijurisdictional legal practice onto the
American Bar’s agenda with its decision in Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon
& Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County.1  The Birbrower
court held that a New York law firm, none of whose attorneys were admitted
to practice law in California, committed the unauthorized practice of law by
advising a California corporation in an impending California arbitration.2
Most troubling from a practitioner’s perspective was the court’s suggestion
that an attorney might practice law “in California,” and thereby commit the
unauthorized practice of law there, by “virtually” entering the state through
telephone, fax, or e-mail.3  The Birbrower decision generated a great deal of
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California client on California law in connection with a California legal dispute by telephone, fax,
computer, or other modern technological means.
Id.  See also John J. D’Attomo, The $1 Million Message:  Lawyers Risk Fees and More When Representing
Out-of-State Clients, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 447, 471 (1999) (“Birbrower’s significance lies in the
court’s unprecedented suggestion that a lawyer who never physically enters a foreign state may nonetheless
violate that state’s unauthorized practice rules through ‘virtual contacts’ with the client or by maintaining
a ‘continuing relationship’ with the client.”).
4. See MJP REPORT, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that “[a]lthough the state law [at issue in Birbrower]
was subsequently and temporarily amended to allow out-of-state lawyers to obtain permission to participate
in certain California arbitrations, concerns have persisted”).
5. See Stephen Gillers, Lessons from the Multijurisdictional Practice Commission:  The Art of
Making Change, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 685, 686 (2002).  Professor Gillers writes:
How to reconcile our traditional lawyer licensing system with changes in the national and
international economy and in the nature of law practice has been part of professional discussion for
some time.  But the need to move beyond discussion and toward clear answers was underscored in
1998 with the Birbrower decision of the California Supreme Court.
Id. (citations omitted).  Professor Gillers was a member of the Multijurisdictional Practice Commission.
Id. at 685.
6. See MJP REPORT, supra note 1, at vii.
7. COMMISSION ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, MISSION STATEMENT, available at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mjp-mission_statement.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2005):
RESOLVED that the American Bar Association establish the Commission on Multijurisdictional
Practice to research, study and report on the application of current ethics and bar admission rules
to the multijurisdictional practice of law.  The Commission shall analyze the impact of those rules
on the practices of in-house counsel, transactional lawyers, litigators and arbitrators and on lawyers
and law firms maintaining offices and practicing in multiple state and federal jurisdictions.  The
Commission shall make policy recommendations to govern the multijurisdictional practice of law
that serve the public interest and take any other action as may be necessary to carry out its
jurisdictional mandate.  The Commission shall also review international issues related to
multijurisdictional practice in the United States.
Id.  For a comprehensive overview of the work of the Multijurisdictional Practice Commission, see Gillers,
supra note 5.
8. See MJP REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-4.  These recommendations addressed the following topics:
Regulation of the Practice of Law by the Judiciary (Recommendation 1); Multijurisdictional Practice of
Law (Recommendation 2); Disciplinary Authority (Recommendation 3); Reciprocal Discipline
(Recommendation 4); Interstate Disciplinary Enforcement Mechanisms (Recommendation 5); Pro Hac Vice
Admission (Recommendation 6); Admission by Motion (Recommendation 7); Licensing of Legal
Consultants (Recommendation 8); and Temporary Practice by Foreign Lawyers (Recommendation 9).  Id.
at 13, 19, 35, 39, 43, 45, 55, 61 & 67.
anxiety among American lawyers4 and prompted the American Bar
Association to create a Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice (“MJP
Commission”).5  The MJP Commission was formed in July 2000,6 with a
mandate to report on the state of multijurisdictional practice in the United
States and to make recommendations that would facilitate that practice in the
public interest.7  The MJP Commission ultimately made nine
recommendations8 to the ABA House of Delegates, which adopted all nine on
2005] THE GATS AND LAWYER REGULATION 655
9. See Summary of Recommendations, American Bar Association House of Delegates, 2002
Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., Recommendations 201A through 201J [hereinafter MJP
Recommendations], available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/recommendations02/summary.html (last
visited Sept. 1, 2004).
10. Included among its nine recommendations to the ABA House of Delegates, the MJP
Commission called for state implementation of the following six model rules:  amended versions of Rule
5.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law) and Rule 8.5 (Disciplinary
Authority; Choice of Law) of the MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2003) [hereinafter MODEL RULES
2003], a MODEL RULE ON PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION (2002), a MODEL RULE ON ADMISSION BY MOTION
(2002), the ABA MODEL RULE FOR THE LICENSING OF LEGAL CONSULTANTS (1993), and a MODEL RULE
FOR TEMPORARY PRACTICE BY FOREIGN LAWYERS (2002).  See MJP REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.  As of
December 9, 2004, just 14 states have adopted rules at least similar to amended Model Rules 5.5 and 8.5.
See State Implementation of ABA Model Rule 5.5, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/jclr/5_5_quick_guide.pdf
(last visited Jan. 10, 2005) and State Implementation of ABA Model Rule 8.5, at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/jclr/8_5_quick_guide.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2005).  As of December 9, 2004, no states have yet
adopted rules identical to the Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice Admission, the Model Rule on Admission by
Motion, the ABA Model Rule for the Licensing of Legal Consultants (although this model rule is based on
New York’s long-standing legal consultant rule), and only Louisiana has adopted a rule identical to the
ABA’s Model Rule for Temporary Practice by Foreign Lawyers.  See State Implementation of ABA MJP
Recommendations, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/jclr/mjp_alpha_chart.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2005).
11. Compare Mike McKee, Bar Welcomes Out-of-Staters—For a Hefty Price, THE RECORDER,
Sept. 14, 2004 (reporting on new California MJP rules that, one observer opined, “create ‘two classes of
lawyers’ with out-of-staters being treated as ‘second-rate’”) with Richard Acello, Foreign Lawyers May
Move In-House, available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/constituent/flc/article_
foreignlawyers.doc (last visited Jan. 10, 2005) (reporting on a preliminary amendment to Washington state
MJP rules that may allow lawyers licensed in non-U.S. jurisdictions to practice as in-house counsel).
12. See infra Part I.
13. General Agreement on Trade in Services [hereinafter GATS], Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakech
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1168 (1994)
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf (last
visited Jan. 10, 2005).
14. WTO SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 161 (1999) [hereinafter
August 12, 2002.9  Despite these laudable efforts, state bar regulators have
been slow to adopt the Commission’s recommendations.10  It seems that the
American legal profession has yet to reach a consensus on when it is
appropriate to permit an out-of-state lawyer to provide legal services in a state
in which that lawyer is not admitted to practice.11  Given the disparity in how
out-of-state lawyers are treated across U.S. jurisdictions,12 the prospects for
eliminating multijurisdictional practice barriers from within the American
legal profession seem poor.  Instead, the catalyst for change may come from
outside the profession, in the form of a trade agreement called the General
Agreement on Trade in Services, or the “GATS.”13
The GATS is the first multilateral trade agreement devoted to the
progressive liberalization of the laws and regulations that govern the cross-
border provision of services.14  The GATS, which is administered by the
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GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS].
15. See WTO Agreement, supra note 13.
16. See WTO, Services Sectoral Classification List, MTN.GNS/W/120 (July 10, 1991) (listing the
services sectors covered by the GATS).
17. See infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
18. See Laurel S. Terry, The GATS and Legal Services:  The Resumed GATS Negotiations Trigger
Additional U.S. and Other Activity, B. EXAMINER, Feb. 2005.
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. Bengoshi are Japanese lawyers engaged in private practice.  For a brief introduction to the
structure of the Japanese legal professions, see Kunio Hamada, Japan, in LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS 218
(Edwin Godfrey ed., 1995).
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. Id.
World Trade Organization (“WTO”),15 governs a wide array of services,
including banking, tourism, and even accounting and legal services.16
Anytime a service or services provider crosses a national border, the
provisions of the GATS might be implicated.  The possibility of the GATS’
application is open in such cross-border circumstances because, when the
GATS became effective in 1995, much of its governing potential regarding
trade in services, including legal services, was left for future negotiation.17
The GATS legal services negotiations are currently ongoing.18  The
importance of these negotiations for American lawyers should not be
underestimated.  The GATS is important even for those practitioners engaged
exclusively in domestic practice because the GATS may eventually influence
how lawyers are governed in the United States.19  In the give-and-take of the
legal services negotiations, U.S. trade negotiators may be willing to grant
foreign lawyers greater rights of practice than those enjoyed by domestic
practitioners.  This, in turn, could lead to calls from the American Bar to grant
domestic lawyers greater interstate practice rights within the United States.
For instance, if U.S. trade negotiations resulted in Japanese bengoshi20 being
permitted to practice law anywhere in the United States, the organized bar in
this country would likely put significant pressure on regulators to permit out-
of-state lawyers to provide legal services in states in which they are not
admitted to practice.21
Some commentators have even suggested that the possible disparity
between foreign and local lawyers precipitated by the GATS, and the
difficulty of coordinating state lawyer regulations, may eventually lead to the
federal government’s involvement in regulating the legal profession.22  Put
another way, there is a chance that U.S. trade negotiators might set in motion
a chain of events that could affect the way law is practiced in this country; and
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23. See Laurel S. Terry, GATS’ Applicability to Transnational Lawyering and Its Potential Impact
on U.S. State Regulation of Lawyers, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 989, 1085 (2001).  Professor Terry’s
article is required reading for those interested in exploring the potential impact of the GATS on legal
services.  For those who are new to the GATS, see INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, GATS:  A
HANDBOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION MEMBER BARS (2002) [hereinafter IBA GATS
HANDBOOK], which provides an excellent introduction to the basic workings of the GATS and
comprehensive explanations of the sometimes unfamiliar terms often employed in trade agreements.
24. See generally Laurel S. Terry, A Challenge to the ABA and the U.S. Legal Profession To
Monitor the GATS 2000 Negotiations:  Why You Should Care, Symposium Issue, PROF. LAW 63 (2001).
25. Carol A. Needham, Multijurisdictional Practice Regulations Governing Attorneys Conducting
a Transactional Practice, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1331, 1339 (2003).  See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W.
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 46.3 (3d ed. Supp. 2004) (“[T]he Rule limiting the practice
of law to licensed attorneys has been a feature of our legal system for 200 years . . . .”).  See also MODEL
they may do so without the considered input of the profession itself.23
Because the GATS may one day profoundly influence the regulation of the
American legal profession, all American lawyers have a vested interest in
understanding how the GATS works and how it may come to affect the way
they practice law.24
This Comment proposes to highlight two fundamental questions related
to the potential influence of the GATS on the regulation of the American legal
profession:  first, whether the impetus the GATS provided will ultimately lead
to changes in the way American lawyers are regulated when engaged in
interstate legal practice; and second, whether the federal government could
regulate lawyers consistent with the Constitution.  Part I of this Comment
surveys state bar admission rules and sets out the conditions under which
lawyers admitted in one U.S. jurisdiction may currently practice in others.
Part II explains how the GATS affects trade in legal services and how it may
ultimately come to influence the regulation of domestic lawyers in the United
States.  An examination of the constitutional provisions that may authorize the
federal regulation of lawyers is the focus of Part III.  Finally, this Comment
concludes that, although formidable political obstacles to the federal
regulation of lawyers undoubtedly exist, the Constitution would not likely
prohibit Congress from playing a role in the regulation of American lawyers
if it chose to do so.
I.  MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN BAR
A.  The Unauthorized Practice of Law
All United States jurisdictions prohibit the unauthorized practice of law,
commonly abbreviated “UPL.”25  This prohibition extends not only to non-
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RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2001) (Unauthorized Practice of Law) [hereinafter MODEL RULES 2001]
(“A lawyer shall not:  (a) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal
profession in that jurisdiction; or (b) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of
activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.”).  Note that this is not the current version of
Model Rule 5.5.  The current version of Model Rule 5.5 incorporates the concept of temporary practice by
out-of-state lawyers.  See infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
26. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 25, § 46.5 (“Legal restrictions in most jurisdictions treat lawyers
who are licensed elsewhere almost as if they were lay persons for purposes of the ‘unauthorized practice’
rules.”).
27. In MJP parlance, a jurisdiction in which a lawyer is admitted to practice is often referred to as
the lawyer’s “home state,” and any other jurisdiction in which that lawyer seeks to practice is a “host state.”
See Gillers, supra note 5, at 686 n.2.
28. Needham, supra note 25.  See, e.g., Washko v. Platz, 534 A.2d 522, 524 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)
(“[A]n attorney licensed to practice law only in a sister state is prohibited from practicing law in
Pennsylvania unless a license to practice in Pennsylvania is obtained . . . .”).
29. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 25, § 46.4 (“Defining the outer limits of the ‘practice of law’ is
practically impossible.  In our law-dominated society, almost every significant financial decision has at least
some legal element to it, and legal elements predominate in many other common transactions.”).
30. See MODEL RULES 2001, supra note 25, R. 5.5 cmt. (“The definition of the practice of law is
established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another”).  A comprehensive survey of the nuances
in state UPL definitions is beyond the scope of this Comment.  Nevertheless, because the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, in many ways, form the normative ethical basis for American lawyers, this
Comment will employ the Model Rules as a guide to the content of state ethics rules, while also noting
significant state-specific deviations, where appropriate.  See PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS,
RULES & STATUTES 4 (John S. Dzienkowski abridged ed. 2003-04).  The introduction states:
Although the ABA’s codes of conduct have been influential in shaping the law of professional
responsibility, they only have force as a body of rules with its voluntary members.  However, the
various states and the federal courts have looked to the ABA versions as a basis for regulating
lawyers within the jurisdiction.  Thus, the ABA’s codes have been used as the basis for state and
federal codes.
Id. at 4.
31. See Needham, supra note 25, at 1332 (“We have created a system in which competent lawyers
chosen by their clients for their expertise in a particular field must question whether they are violating
unauthorized practice of law provisions as they perform even the most routine legal work.”).
lawyers, but also to lawyers licensed in other jurisdictions.26  This has
typically meant that unless an out-of-state lawyer’s practice falls within a
recognized exception in a host state,27 only persons who have been admitted
to that state’s bar may practice law in that state.28  But, as Birbrower amply
demonstrates, the phrase “practice of law” is an inherently slippery concept
for which there is no widely accepted definition.29  Consequently, state
legislatures and courts have adopted various formulations of the phrase for the
purposes of their respective UPL prohibitions.30  This diversity of definition
presents challenges for the multijurisdictional practitioner because it may be
difficult for her to know with certainty what is or is not the “practice of law”
in any given jurisdiction.31  Whatever gloss states may give to their
unauthorized practice of law prohibitions, the purpose is, ostensibly, consumer
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32. See MODEL RULES 2001, supra note 25, R. 5.5 cmt. (“Whatever the definition, limiting the
practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified
persons.”).  See also Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?  An Economic Analysis of
the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 435 (2001) (noting the classic
justification for entry regulations as “the protection of unsuspecting consumers from incompetent
practitioners”).  Professor Barton also notes that “[t]his justification actually involves two connected claims:
the legal market is subject to serious information asymmetries, and incompetent practitioners can inflict
irreversible or irremediable harms upon clients.”  Id.
33. See Needham, supra note 25, at 1331 (“There are a variety of vantage points from which to view
attorney licensing regulations.  Choosing the perspective from which to view those provisions goes a long
way toward predicting which issues stand out in high relief, and which recede in importance.”).
34. For an early recognition of this reality, see In re Estate of Waring, 221 A.2d 193, 197 (N.J.
1966):
Multistate relationships are a common part of today’s society and are to be dealt with in
commonsense fashion.  While the members of the general public are entitled to full protection
against unlawful practitioners, their freedom of choice in the selection of their own counsel is to be
highly regarded and not burdened by “technical restrictions which have no reasonable justification.”
Id.  See also HAZARD & HODES, supra note 25, § 46.3 (“[T]he prohibition against unauthorized practice
also functions, at least in part, as a trade restriction that precludes nonlawyers from legal tasks, however
routine.”).  As Sydney Cone has put it, “[n]ot infrequently, the local legal profession, in the name of
protecting ‘the public,’ has done a mighty fine job of protecting itself.”  SYDNEY M. CONE, III,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN LEGAL SERVICES:  REGULATION OF LAWYERS AND FIRMS IN GLOBAL PRACTICE,
In:3 (1996).
35. Needham, supra note 25, at 1332.
36. See supra note 25.
37. Id.
38. See MJP REPORT, supra note 1, at 24 (“Rule 5.5 would be clarified and strengthened by
adoption of amended sections 5.5(a) and (b).”).  Amended Rule 5.5(a) and (b) provide:
(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal
profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.
(b) A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not:
(1) except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish an office or other systematic
protection.32  But, when viewed from the perspective of multijurisdictional
practitioners,33 whose clients are increasingly engaged in interstate if not
international transactions,34 the lawyer admission system and UPL regulations
instead represent significant barriers to effective practice.35
One way of helping practitioners successfully navigate the UPL minefield
is for states to enact “temporary practice” rules that permit out-of-state
lawyers to render legal advice in a host state under certain conditions.  This
was the approach endorsed by the ABA in its 2002 revision of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.  As noted above,36 the former Model Rule 5.5
prohibited a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction where doing so would
violate the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction.37  In addition
to clarifying and strengthening the unauthorized practice prohibition in Rule
5.5,38 the amended Rule provides certain “safe harbors” from charges of
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and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law; or
(2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law
in this jurisdiction.
MODEL RULES 2003, supra note 10, R. 5.5.
39. See MJP REPORT, supra note 1, at 24 n.33 (reporting the Commission’s decision not to use the
term “safe harbor” in the amended version of Rule 5.5, but noting that “the term . . . has been a useful
metaphor for conceptualizing the categories of legal work that a lawyer admitted in one jurisdiction may
do in another jurisdiction”).  The approach of amended Model Rule 5.5 is consistent with the approach
endorsed by RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3 (2000):
§ 3.  Jurisdictional Scope of the Practice of Law by a Lawyer
A lawyer currently admitted to practice in a jurisdiction may provide legal services to a client:
. . . .
(3) at a place within a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not admitted to the extent that the
lawyer’s activities arise out of or are otherwise reasonably related to the lawyer’s
practice [in a jurisdiction in which he is admitted].
40. See MJP REPORT, supra note 1, at 23 (“The MJP Commission proposes to re-title the Rule
‘Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law.’”).  The pre-2002 title of Model Rule
5.5 was simply “Unauthorized Practice of Law.”  See MODEL RULES 2001, supra note 25.
41. MODEL RULES 2003, supra note 10, R. 5.5(c)(1):
A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from
practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that:
(1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and
who actively participates in the matter . . . .
42. Id. R. 5.5(c)(2) (applying to legal services that “are in or reasonably related to a pending or
potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer
is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so
authorized”).  For a discussion of the concept of “admission pro hac vice” see infra notes 57-61 and
accompanying text.
43. Id. R. 5.5(c)(3) (applying to legal services that “are in or reasonably related to a pending or
potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another
jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction
in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice
admission”).
unauthorized practice of law for those practitioners engaged in legal work in
more than one jurisdiction.39  Amended Model Rule 5.5 has accordingly been
re-titled to reflect its enhanced scope.40
Under amended Model Rule 5.5, an out-of-state lawyer may now practice
with a local lawyer who is admitted to practice in that jurisdiction and who
actively assists the out-of-state lawyer in pursuing the matter.41  An out-of-
state lawyer may also practice in a state where he has been admitted pro hac
vice.42  Moreover, in proceedings that do not require admission pro hac vice,
an out-of-state lawyer may practice in the host jurisdiction if the services
rendered are related to an arbitration or other alternative dispute resolution,
so long as those proceedings arise out of the lawyer’s practice in a state in
which she is admitted to practice.43  Where the practice does not fall within
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44. Id. R. 5.5(c)(4) (applying to legal services that “are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3) and
arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is
admitted to practice”).  Regarding the content of the requirement that the matter in the host-state
jurisdiction be “reasonably related” to the out-of-state lawyer’s local practice, found in both subsection
(c)(3) & (c)(4), see id. cmt. 14.
45. Id. R. 5.5(d) (“A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or
suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction that:  (1) are
provided to the lawyer’s employer or its organizational affiliates and are not services for which the forum
requires pro hac vice admission; or (2) are services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law
or other law of this jurisdiction.”).  For more on multijurisdictional practice issues facing corporate, or “in-
house,” counsel, see generally Needham, supra note 25.
46. See supra note 10.
47. In addition to the fifty states and the District of Columbia, the following analysis also includes
consideration of the bar admission rules of the U.S. dependencies of Guam, Northern Mariana Islands,
Palau, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.  This approach is consistent with the practice followed in
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINE RS & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL
EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS
(Erica Moeser & Margaret Fuller Cornelle eds., 2003) [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE].  See, e.g., id.
at 28 (listing the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the five dependencies).
the above exceptions, but nonetheless arises out of or is reasonably related to
a lawyer’s home-state practice, the out-of state lawyer may be admitted on a
temporary basis.44  Lastly, amended Model Rule 5.5 provides an exception for
multijurisdictional practice by corporate counsel.45
Although the incorporation of the temporary practice concept into revised
Model Rule 5.5 may signal an evolving awareness of the importance of
multijurisdictional practice in the United States, not all states have been quick
to adopt the revised Model Rules approach.46  As a result, many lawyers will
not necessarily be able to take advantage of these generous multijurisdictional
practice provisions.  Instead, they will have to qualify under special provisions
of state bar admission or court rules, or sit for another bar examination.  These
alternative methods of admission are briefly discussed below.
B.  State Bar Admission Rules:  A Brief Introduction
Attempting to summarize the bar admission requirements of fifty-six
American jurisdictions47 can be a perilous undertaking.  Differences, large and
small, in the way states implement their respective bar admission policies
often drain generalizations of much of their usefulness.  Nevertheless, some
categorization of American bar admission rules is possible.  For the purposes
of this Comment, state admission rules are divided into two broad categories:
those that confer full bar membership on out-of-state lawyers, and those that
merely grant limited practice rights within a state.
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48. See MJP REPORT, supra note 1, at 5 (“The traditional route to bar admission includes graduating
from an accredited law school, passing the admitting state’s bar examination, and satisfying the state’s bar
examiners that the applicant possesses the requisite character to practice law.”).
49. These jurisdictions include:  Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas,
Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, South Dakota, Guam, Palau, and Puerto Rico.  See
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 47, at 25.  As a general matter, none of these jurisdictions permit
“admission on motion.”  For a discussion of the concept of “admission on motion,” see infra notes 51-55
and accompanying text.  Some of these jurisdictions nevertheless make exceptions to the general rule.  For
example, in Alabama, “[a]dmission on motion is limited to law professors with three consecutive years of
full-time employment at an ABA-approved law school in Alabama and prior admission in another
jurisdiction.”  Id. at 26.
50. These jurisdictions include:  California, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Rhode Island,
Utah, Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands.  See id. at 28.  For instance, the California Rules
provide that:
An attorney applicant who has been admitted to practice in a sister state, or any United States
jurisdiction, possession, territory, or dependency the United States hereafter acquires, may elect to
take the Attorneys’ Examination rather than the entire California Bar Examination provided that
he or she has been an active member in good standing of the bar of the admitting state or
jurisdiction, possession, territory or dependency for at least four years immediately preceding the
first day of the administration of the California Bar Examination for which the applicant applied.
RULES REGULATING ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW IN CALIFO RNIA, R. IV, § 2 (2002).  The Rules further
provide that “[t]he Attorneys’ Examination shall consist of the written questions and performance tests from
the California Bar Examination and shall be graded in accordance with standards and procedures
established by the Committee [of Bar Examiners] acting in its sound discretion.”  Id. at R. VIII, § 2(c).
1.  The Full Admission Option:  Attorneys Exams, Admission on Motion,
and Reciprocity
It is always possible that an out-of-state lawyer with significant practice
interests outside her home jurisdiction might choose to become a member of
another state’s bar in the traditional way:  passing the state’s standard bar
examination and submitting to its character and fitness evaluation.48  In fact,
this is the only way to become a full-fledged member of the bar in some
jurisdictions.49  As an alternative to sitting for a standard bar examination,
nine jurisdictions now permit out-of-state lawyers to become full members of
the bar by passing a shorter examination, sometimes called an “attorneys’
exam.”50  But, given the time, expense, and effort that must be devoted to
taking any bar examination, even an abbreviated one, this traditional route to
bar admission is an unrealistic option for most multijurisdictional
practitioners.
Perhaps the most common method by which an out-of-state lawyer may
become a permanent member of a host state bar is through that state’s
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51. There are currently thirty-three U.S. jurisdictions that allow for some form of “admission on
motion,” including:  Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  See
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 47, at 25.
52. See Jennifer L. Binkley, Admission on Motion:  Current Practices and Rules, B. EXAMINER,
Nov. 2000, at 23 (“Motion admission . . . allows attorneys who are licensed in one jurisdiction to be
admitted to another jurisdiction without taking a bar examination if they satisfy certain other
requirements.”).
53. Seventeen of the thirty-three states that permit some form of admission on motion require the
applicant to have been actively engaged in the practice of law for five out of the last seven years.  See
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 47, at 25.  This is also the length of time set in the ABA’s Model Rule
on Admission by Motion (“The applicant shall . . . (c) have been primarily engaged in the active practice
of law in one or more states, territories or the District of Columbia for five of the seven years immediately
preceding the date upon which the application is filed.”).  See MJP REPORT, supra note 1, at 55.
54. These jurisdictions include:  Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  See COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note
47, at 28.
55. See Binkley, supra note 52, at 27 (“One of the most common elements of the various
jurisdictions’ motion admission rules is a reciprocity requirement, i.e., a requirement that the jurisdiction
in which the motion applicant is already licensed allow motion admission of licensees from the jurisdiction
in which the applicant seeks admission.”).  For example, the list of states with which Pennsylvania has a
reciprocity arrangement can be found on the website of the Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners, at
http://www.pabarexam.org/Bar_Examination/Reciprocity_Information.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2005)
(listing thirty-one jurisdictions).
“admission on motion” procedure.51  Admission on motion procedures permit
a lawyer who is a member in good standing of the bar of another state to
become a full member of the admitting state’s bar without the need to a take
another bar examination.52  Admission rules typically require the out-of-state
lawyer to have actively practiced in his home state for a certain number of
years prior to admission in the host state.  The required term in most states is
currently five out of the past seven years.53  Lastly, many states only permit
an out-of-state lawyer to be admitted on motion if the lawyer’s home state bar
extends the same privilege to members of the bar of the admitting state.54  In
other words, these states require an element of reciprocity between the
admitting state and the applicant lawyer’s home state.55
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56. See supra note 10.
57. See MJP REPORT, supra note 1, at 50 (“Courts in all United States jurisdictions regularly admit
lawyers from other United States jurisdictions to appear as counsel pro hac vice.”).  Admission pro hac vice
is the temporary admission of an out-of-state lawyer admitted to practice before a particular court in a
specific case.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 49 (7th ed. 1999).  As noted above, the ABA House of
Delegates has adopted a Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice Admission.  See supra note 10.  Because this Model
Rule has not yet been widely enacted, id., the examples in this section are drawn from state pro hac vice
rules.
58. See, e.g., PA. BAR ADMISSION R. 301(b):
Such admissions shall be only on motion of a member of the bar of this Commonwealth.  Except
as otherwise prescribed by general rule, written notice of such motion shall be signed by such
member of the bar, shall recite all relevant facts and shall be filed with the clerk of the court in
which or with the district justice before which the matter is pending at least three days prior to the
motion.
See also MJP REPORT, supra note 1, at 50 (“Such admission has been almost a matter of course when
sought in conjunction with locally admitted counsel.”).
59. See, e.g., PA. BAR ADMISSION R. 301(a) (“An attorney, barrister or advocate who is qualified
to practice in the courts of another state or of any foreign jurisdiction may be specially admitted to the bar
of this Commonwealth for purposes limited to a particular matter.  He or she shall not, however, thereby
be authorized to act as attorney of record.”).  See also MJP REPORT, supra note 1, at 50 (“Typically, the
pro hac vice process does not allow out-of-state lawyers to practice regularly in the jurisdiction and requires
that the applicant attest to knowledge of and compliance with local rules of conduct and practice.”).
60. MJP REPORT, supra note 1, at 50 (“In most jurisdictions, there is little procedural structure for
addressing pro hac vice applications, which are entrusted solely to the discretion of the court asked to admit
the lawyer.”).  Cf. PA. BAR ADMISSION R. 301(b) (“Any court or district justice shall grant such a motion
unless good cause for denial shall appear.”).
2.  The Limited Admission Option:  Pro Hac Vice, Corporate Counsel, and
Foreign Legal Consultant Rules
Although the “temporary practice” concept incorporated into revised
Model Rule 5.5 has yet to gain universal acceptance,56 courts in all United
States jurisdictions make some provision for the admission of out-of-state
lawyers pro hac vice.57  A motion for admission pro hac vice is typically
brought by local counsel on behalf of an out-of-state lawyer who seeks
permission to appear before the court to which the motion is made.58  Such
admission is usually limited to a particular case pending before the admitting
court and generally does not permit the out-of-state lawyer to act as attorney
of record.59  The rule in each state is different, but the power to grant
admission pro hac vice nearly always resides in the discretion of the court.60
While pro hac vice admission procedures work reasonably well in the
litigation context, they are generally not available outside the courtroom and
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61. Needham, supra note 25, at 1335 (“[P]ro hac vice admission is not a reliable method of
ensuring permission to provide legal services.  It is not available in litigated matters until after a case has
been filed with a court, and such admission is not available at all for purely transactional matters.”).
62. Twelve U.S. jurisdictions have enacted corporate counsel admission rules.  They include:
Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina,
Washington, and the Virgin Islands.  See COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 47, at 36.  Note that these
rules also generally apply to other institutional entities.  See Needham, supra note 25, at 1345 (“Typically,
these regulations also apply to lawyers who practice exclusively for associations, governmental entities, and
business organizations other than corporations.”).
63. Needham, supra note 25, at 1344.  This approach has also been endorsed by the Restatement
of the Law Governing Lawyers.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3, cmt.
f (2000).  The Restatement observes:
States have permitted practice within the jurisdiction by inside legal counsel for a corporation or
similar organization, even if the lawyer is not locally admitted and even if the lawyer’s work
consists entirely of in-state activities, when all of the lawyer’s work is for the employer-client . . .
and does not involve appearance in court.  Leniency is appropriate because the only concern is with
the client-employer, who is presumably in a good position to assess the quality and fitness of the
lawyer’s work.  In the course of such work, the lawyer may deal with outsiders, such as by
negotiating with others in settling litigation or directing the activities of lawyers who do enter an
appearance for the organization in litigation.
Id.
64. See, e.g., Needham, supra note 25, at 1340-41:
Lawyer A works for ABC Company, serving as the expert in consumer credit issues for ABC’s
nationwide lending operation.  Especially in areas requiring sophisticated legal analysis, the
attorneys in a legal department are commonly responsible for advising the corporation and its
affiliates on a specific area of the law.  In this system, Lawyer A will handle all legal questions
within his assigned topic, regardless of the geographical location in which the issue arises.  His
office is located in New York and he usually performs most of his work there.  Throughout a single
day, he may answer questions regarding consumer credit regulations in California, Nevada,
Pennsylvania, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, and Texas.
65. Id. at 1346.
thus provide no protection from UPL violations to lawyers engaged in purely
transactional matters.61
For this reason, some states have adopted an exemption from their UPL
regulations for “in-house” or corporate counsel.62  This exemption typically
permits an out-of-state lawyer to practice in the host jurisdiction provided that
she only performs legal services for her corporate employer.63  In addition to
creating a safe harbor from UPL violations, corporate counsel rules also
facilitate lawyer specialization in large corporate enterprises, obviating the
need for a company to maintain specialized legal counsel in each jurisdiction
in which it does business.64  For institutional attorneys, the corporate counsel
exemptions are a marked improvement over the admission on motion process,
largely because they eschew minimum practice periods that could keep in-
house counsel from practicing in some jurisdictions for five or more years.65
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66. There are currently twenty-five U.S. jurisdictions that permit the admission of foreign legal
consultants.  They are:  Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Washington, and the Virgin Islands.
See COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 47, at 36.  The ABA House of Delegates has also adopted a Model
Rule for the Licensing of Legal Consultants that would permit a foreign lawyer who meets certain criteria
to practice on a regular basis within the state without becoming a member of a state bar, but subject to
certain limitations on the lawyer’s scope of practice.  See MJP REPORT, supra note 1, at 61-66.  In addition,
the ABA has recognized the need for rules regarding foreign lawyers who may not practice regularly in the
United States, and, thus, would not qualify for legal consultant status, by recommending the enactment of
the ABA Model Rule for Temporary Practice by Foreign Lawyers.  See MJP REPORT, supra note 1, at 67.
This model rule extends the “safe harbor” concept of revised Model Rule 5.5 to foreign legal practitioners.
See id. at 68.
67. See generally Carol A. Needham, The Licensing of Foreign Legal Consultants in the United
States, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1126 (1998).
68. See generally CONE, supra note 34, § 1.4.1, at 1:11 (outlining different options jurisdictions
take regarding foreign lawyers).
69. Id.
70. New York is a logical starting point for any investigation of state FLC rules because it was
among the first states to adopt a foreign legal consultant rule, doing so in 1974.  For an excellent account
of the developments leading to the adoption of the New York FLC rule, see id. §§ 3.1-3.6.  The New York
example is also appropriate because its FLC rule was the model for many subsequent state FLC rules and
the ABA Model Rule for the Licensing of Legal Consultants.  See id. §§ 4.1-4.3; State Implementation of
ABA MJP Recommendations, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/jclr/mjp_alpha_chart.pdf (last visited Jan. 10,
2005), at 18.  Some time is spent here analyzing the requirements of the New York FLC rule because, if
the GATS ultimately fulfills its promise in the legal services sector and helps dismantle barriers to the cross-
border practice of law, state FLC rules will likely be the first point at which governmental regulation meets
the realities of transnational legal practice.  Whether state FLC rules fulfill the requirements of the GATS
will depend upon the outcome of future negotiations, but understanding what these rules require is a
necessary first step to reconciling the various U.S. lawyer regulatory regimes and any multilateral system
that ultimately emerges from the GATS negotiations.  For more on the GATS legal services negotiations,
Yet another avenue for a limited form of bar admission is found in the
procedures for the licensing of foreign legal consultants, or “FLCs.”66  FLCs
are non-U.S. lawyers who usually seek a limited form of admission in
commercially important states like New York or California for the purposes
of representing foreign companies doing business in the United States or U.S.
companies doing business abroad.67  Jurisdictions that permit foreign lawyers
to practice as FLCs generally do not require those lawyers to sit for qualifying
examinations, but they often severely restrict the types of legal services that
the foreign lawyer may provide.68  They also typically lay down requirements
that relate to the FLC’s prior professional experience, good standing, and
general character.69
The New York rules for the licensing of foreign legal consultants are
illustrative of the kinds of requirements that are found in other state FLC
rules.70  In order to be licensed as a foreign legal consultant in New York, a
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see infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
71. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 521.1(a) (2002).
72. Id. § 521.1(a)(1) (stating that the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court may license an
applicant to practice as a legal consultant who “is a member in good standing of a recognized legal
profession in a foreign country, the members of which are admitted to practice as attorneys or counselors
at law or the equivalent and are subject to effective regulation and discipline by a duly constituted
professional body or a public authority”).
73. Id. § 521.1(a)(2) (permitting licensing of an applicant who, “for at least three of the five years
immediately preceding his or her application, has been a member in good standing of such legal profession
and has actually been engaged in the practice of law in such foreign country or elsewhere substantially
involving or relating to the rendering of advice or the provision of legal services concerning the law of such
foreign country”).
74. Id. § 521.1(a)(3) (permitting licensing of an applicant who “possesses the good moral character
and general fitness requisite for a member of the bar of this State”).
75. Id. § 521.1(a)(4) (permitting licensing of an applicant who “is over 26 years of age”).
76. Id. at § 521.1(a)(5) (permittinig licensing of an applicant who “intends to practice as a legal
consultant in this State and to maintain an office in this State for that purpose”).
77. Id. § 521.3(a).  This subsection states that:
A person licensed to practice as a legal consultant under this Part may render legal services in this
State; subject, however, to the limitations that he or she shall not:  (a) appear for a person other than
himself or herself as attorney in any court, or before any magistrate or other judicial officer, in this
State (other than upon admission pro hac vice pursuant to section 520.11 of this Title).
Id.
78. Id. § 521.3(b) (stating that an FLC shall not “prepare any instrument effecting the transfer or
registration of title to real estate located in the United States of America”).
79. Id. § 521.3(c) (stating that an FLC shall not “prepare:  (1) any will or trust instrument effecting
the disposition on death of any property located in the United States of America and owned by a resident
thereof; or (2) any instrument relating to the administration of a decedent’s estate in the United States of
America”).
80. Id. § 521.3(d) (stating that an FLC shall not “prepare any instrument in respect of the marital
or parental relations, right or duties of a resident of the United States of America, or the custody or care of
the children of such a resident”).
81. Id. § 521.3(e).  An FLC shall not:
render professional legal advice on the law of this State or the United States of America (whether
foreign lawyer must meet several formal and substantive requirements.71  The
foreign lawyer must enjoy good professional standing in her home country72
and have practiced the law of that country for at least three of the most recent
five years.73  She must also fulfill the necessary character and fitness
requirements74 and be over twenty-six years old.75  In addition, she must show
that she intends to practice as a legal consultant in New York and to maintain
an office there.76  An FLC’s practice in New York is also circumscribed in a
number of important ways.  FLCs are not permitted to appear in court on
behalf of their clients.77  Moreover, the FLC may not practice at all in the
areas of real estate,78 decedents’ estates,79 and family law.80  Lastly, when
advising on New York or U.S. federal law, the FLC must seek the advice of
a member of the New York Bar.81
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rendered incident to the preparation of legal instruments or otherwise), except on the basis of advice
from a person duly qualified and entitled (other than by virtue of having been licensed under this
Part) to render professional legal advice in this State on such law.
Id.
82. See WTO, INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2003 (2003), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/res_e/statis_e/its2003_e/its2003_e.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2005).  In 2002, the value of global
services exports totaled U.S. $1570 billion, or nearly a quarter of all exports worldwide.  Id. at 2 (Table 1).
In order to get an idea of the magnitude of the growth of the services trade in recent years, consider that
exports of services rose six percent over the year 2001-2002, an increase that represents approximately the
same amount of growth over the ten-year period 1990-2000.  Id.
83. GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS, supra note 14, at 161.
84. Id. (“The GATS rules are not quite complete, and are largely untested.  This process of filling
the gaps will require several more years of negotiations, and experience will no doubt show a need to
improve some of the existing rules.”).  Professor Laurel Terry has described the GATS as an example of a
Part I of this Comment demonstrates that there is tremendous diversity in
how multijurisdictional practitioners are regulated across United States
jurisdictions.  This lack of uniformity has created a patchwork of regulation
in which lawyers must satisfy often-conflicting admission rules in order to
practice, even temporarily, in multiple jurisdictions.  As more and more
barriers to the conduct of business across state and national borders are
dismantled, the continued power of states to restrict the multijurisdictional
practice of law is increasingly anomalous.  The instrument of change might be
found in the General Agreement on Trade in Services.  It is possible that the
treaty obligations that the United States has assumed pursuant to the GATS
could eventually lead to federal involvement in the regulation of American
lawyers.  Explaining how the GATS affects “trade” in legal services, and how
it might eventually lead to federal involvement in lawyer regulation is the
focus of Part II.
II.  THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES
A.  How the GATS Affects Trade in Legal Services
The negotiation and signing of the GATS during the Uruguay Round
trade negotiations signaled the large and growing importance of “trade in
services” to the global economy.82  Moreover, the centrality of the GATS in
the international regulation of services regimes has led some to call the
Agreement the most important development in the multilateral trading system
since the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) became effective
in 1948.83  Nevertheless, the GATS is still in its early days, and much of how
its rules will govern trade in services has been left for future negotiations.84
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“legislative-delegation model” of regulating the cross-border provision of services because it leaves the task
of developing more detailed obligations to various WTO institutions.  See Laurel S. Terry, A Case Study
of the Hybrid Model for Facilitating Cross-Border Legal Practice:  The Agreement Between the American
Bar Association and the Brussels Bars, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1382, 1392 (1998) (discussing the
operation of such a model in the development of rules to govern the cross-border provision of legal
services).
85. GATS, supra note 13, art. XIX(1):
In pursuance of the objectives of this Agreement, Members shall enter into successive rounds of
negotiations, beginning not later than five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement and periodically thereafter, with a view to achieving a progressively higher level of
liberalization.  Such negotiations shall be directed to the reduction or elimination of the adverse
effects on trade in services of measures as a means of providing effective market access.  This
process shall take place with a view to promoting the interests of all participants on a mutually
advantageous basis and to securing an overall balance of rights and obligations.
86. Press Release, WTO, Services Negotiations Formally Launched (Feb. 25, 2000), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news00_e/servfe_e.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2005).
87. See, e.g., Director General Renato Ruggiero, Towards GATS 2000—A European Strategy,
Address to the Conference on Trade in Services, organized by the European Commission, in Brussels
(June 2, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sprr_e/bruss1_e.htm (last visited Jan. 10,
2005).
88. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 23, at 1050 & n.193 (employing the term and explaining its
meaning).
89. WTO Ministerial Conference, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001).
90. Id. ¶ 15:
The negotiations on trade in services shall be conducted with a view to promoting the economic
growth of all trading partners and the development of developing and least-developed countries.
We recognize the work already undertaken in the negotiations, initiated in January 2000 under
Article XIX of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, and the large number of proposals
submitted by Members on a wide range of sectors and several horizontal issues, as well as on
movement of natural persons.  We reaffirm the Guidelines and Procedures for the Negotiations
adopted by the Council for Trade in Services on 28 March 2001 as the basis for continuing the
negotiations, with a view to achieving the objectives of the General Agreement on Trade in Services,
as stipulated in the Preamble, Article IV and Article XIX of that Agreement.
Article XIX of the GATS, entitled “Negotiation of Specific
Commitments,” provides for future liberalizing negotiations to begin no later
than five years after the GATS’ coming into force.85  In accordance with this
mandate, on February 25, 2000, new services negotiations began.86  These
negotiations were often referred to as the “GATS 2000 negotiations”87 or the
“built-in agenda” negotiations.88  On November 14, 2001, the WTO
Ministerial Conference meeting in Doha, Qatar, adopted the Fourth
Ministerial Declaration, which launched the current round of trade
negotiations known as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA).89  This “Doha
Declaration” also endorsed the work that had been done in the GATS 2000
negotiations and subsumed its future work into the DDA negotiating
framework.90  These negotiations were to conclude no later than January 1,
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91. Id. ¶ 45 (“The negotiations to be pursued under the terms of this declaration shall be concluded
not later than 1 January 2005.”).
92. See id. ¶ 15 (“Participants shall submit initial requests for specific commitments by 30 June
2002 and initial offers by 31 March 2003.”).  The Doha negotiations, including the so-called “Track 1”
GATS legal services negotiations, were temporarily abandoned in September 2003 at the Fifth WTO
Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico.  For more information on the breakdown on the Cancún
negotiations see Laurel S. Terry, Current Developments Regarding the GATS and Legal Services:  The
Cancun Ministerial GATS Negotiations, B. EXAMINER, Feb. 2004, at 38.  The WTO Member States
resumed the Track 1 negotiations and the rest of the Doha Work Programme pursuant to an August 1, 2004,
decision of the WTO General Council.  The decision did not set a revised deadline for conclusion of the
services negotiations but did set a May 2005 deadline for the tabling of revised services offers.  See WTO,
Doha Work Programme:  Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579, at 3
& Annex C (Aug. 2, 2004).
93. Cf. Paul D. Paton, Legal Services and the GATS:  Norms as Barriers to Trade, 9 NEW. ENG. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 361, 405-06 (2003) (analyzing Member State DDA proposals on legal services and noting
a “very limited ambition for meaningful liberalization of legal services”).
94. A fuller treatment of these “disciplines” track negotiations is beyond the scope of this Comment,
but see IBA GATS HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 3.
Currently, there are two different sets of events ongoing in Geneva of which member bars should
be aware (and may want to participate).  The first ongoing activity is the development of horizontal
disciplines on domestic regulation.  The second development is the new Doha Round of negotiations
for further liberalization of trade in services.  Although there is some overlap between these two
‘tracks’ or developments, they are different and Member Bars should be aware of both.
Id.
95. See CONE, supra note 34, § 2.4.2, at 2:15 (using this phrase to describe the GATS itself).
96. GATS, supra note 13.  Only one of these annexes, Annex on Article II Exemptions, is relevant
to legal services.  See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.  The other annexes include:  Annex on
Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agreement, Annex on Air Transport Services,
Annex on Financial Services, Second Annex on Financial Services, Annex on Maritime Transport Services,
Annex on Telecommunications, and Annex on Basic Telecommunications.  See GATS, supra note 13.  The
Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agreement would seem to apply to
legal services; however, on March 1, 1995, the Council for Trade in Services effectively nullified the import
2005,91 and were the kind of “request-offer” negotiations that have become
familiar over the past fifty years within the GATT framework.92  There is,
however, another “track” of negotiations currently ongoing in Geneva that
could more profoundly affect the way that the GATS regulates trade in legal
services.93  These are the negotiations occurring in the Working Party on
Domestic Regulation (WPDR), which is considering the feasibility of
developing universal procedures for opening markets to foreign legal
practitioners.94  In the meantime, we are left with the Agreement itself and the
ways in which it currently constrains WTO members from erecting
protectionist barriers to services markets.
The GATS obligations and derogations of WTO Member States are found
in the following documents:  (1) the “framework agreement”95 made up of the
twenty-nine articles and eight annexes96 found in Annex 1B of the WTO
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of this Annex by adopting a conclusion of the Sub-Committee on Services that “what appears in the
schedules of participants is sufficiently clear and . . . that there was no need for further multilateral work
on this issue.”  Council for Trade in Services, Issues Relating to the Scope of the GATS:  Report by the
Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Services, S/C/1 (Feb. 15, 1995); Council for Trade in Services, Report
of the Meeting Held on 1 March 1995:  Note by the Secretariat, S/C/M/1 (Mar. 22, 1995).
97. GATS, supra note 13.
98. WTO, GUIDE TO READING THE GATS SCHEDULES OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS AND THE LIST OF
ARTICLE II (MFN) EXEMPTIONS [hereinafter GUIDE TO READING GATS SCHEDULES], at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2005) (“A specific commitment in a services
schedule is an undertaking to provide market access and national treatment for the service activity in
question on the terms and conditions specified in the schedule.”).  For an excellent explanation of how
GATS schedules developed and their foundation in the WTO request-offer system, see Terry, supra note
23, at 1004.
99. See infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
101. GATS, supra note 13, art. I(1) (“This Agreement applies to measures by Members affecting
trade in services.”).
102. Id. art. I(3)(b) (stating that “‘services’ includes any service in any sector except services
supplied in the exercise of governmental authority”) (emphasis added).
103. Id. art. I(2)(a) (defining “trade in services” as the supply of services “from the territory of one
Member into the territory of any other Member”).  This mode of supply is implicated whenever the service
itself crosses a border.  See Terry, supra note 23, at 1008 (“Mode 1 is involved whenever foreign lawyers
create a legal product or advice, which is then sent from outside the U.S. border to clients inside the United
States.”).
104. GATS, supra note 13, art. I(2)(b) (defining “trade in services” as the supply of services “in the
territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other Member”).  This provision speaks to the
ability of a consumer from one Member State to go to another Member State and to buy services while
there.  See Terry, supra note 23, at 1008 (“Mode 2, or Consumption abroad, involves the ability of U.S.
citizens to purchase abroad the services of foreign lawyers.”).
105. GATS, supra note 13, art. I(2)(c) (defining “trade in services” as the supply of services “by a
Agreement;97 (2) the Schedules of Specific Commitments98 reflecting
obligations assumed by WTO Member States in specific services sectors at the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations;99 and (3) lists of authorized
exemptions from most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment filed by WTO
Members with respect to certain services sectors.100  Each of these sources will
be considered in turn.
1.  The Framework Agreement
Part I of the framework agreement (“Scope and Definition”) delineates
the reach101 of the GATS and provides a rather broad definition of trade in
services.102  This definition includes the supply of services in any one of four
different “modes.”  These include:  (1) the “cross-border” supply of
services;103 (2) the “consumption abroad” of services;104 (3) the “commercial
presence” of foreign services suppliers;105 and (4) the temporary “presence of
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service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member”).  This
is also commonly referred to as the “right of establishment.”  See Terry, supra note 23, at 1008 (“Mode 3,
or Commercial presence, involves the ability of foreign lawyers to set up a permanent presence in the
United States, such as a branch office.”).
106. GATS, supra note 13, art. I(2)(d) (defining “trade in services” as the supply of services “by a
service supplier of one Member, through the presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any
other Member”).  See Terry, supra note 23, at 1008 (“Mode 4, or the presence of Natural Persons, addresses
the situation in which the foreign lawyers themselves enter the United States in order to offer legal
services.”).
107. See infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
108. GUIDE TO READING GATS SCHEDULES, supra note 98 (“The national schedules all conform to
a standard format which is intended to facilitate comparative analysis.”).
109. GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS, supra note 14, at 165 (“Part II sets out ‘general
obligations and disciplines.’  These are basic rules that apply to all members and, for the most part, to all
services.”).
110. GATS, supra note 13, art. II(1) (“With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each
Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other
Member treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other
country.”).
111. See id. art. III(1):
Each Member shall publish promptly and, except in emergency situations, at the latest by the time
of their entry into force, all relevant measures of general application which pertain to or affect the
operation of this Agreement.  International agreements pertaining to or affecting trade in services
to which a Member is a signatory shall also be published.
natural persons.”106  This multifaceted definition of “services” may, at first
blush, seem rather complicated, but the four modes of supply form the
categories in which WTO Member States schedule concessions.107  The
categorization of services in this way also permits meaningful comparisons of
the varying restrictions that Member States may impose in particular services
sectors.108
GATS obligations imposed on Member States come in two basic
varieties:  unconditional and conditional.  Part II of the framework agreement
(entitled “General Obligations and Disciplines”) contains the unconditional
obligations—those undertakings that apply to all WTO Members regardless
of whether they have scheduled commitments in specific services sectors.109
The most important of these obligations is the duty to provide most-favored-
nation (MFN) treatment to services and service suppliers of other Members,110
an undertaking already familiar to students of the GATT.  There are, however,
other unconditional GATS commitments unknown to the GATT, including
measures related to transparency,111 recognition of academic and professional
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112. See id. art. VII(1):
For the purposes of the fulfillment, in whole or in part, of its standards or criteria for the
authorization, licensing or certification of services suppliers . . . a Member may recognize the
education or experience obtained, requirements met, or licenses or certifications granted in a
particular country.  Such recognition, which may be achieved through harmonization or otherwise,
may be based upon an agreement with the country concerned or may be accorded autonomously.
113. As used in the GATS, the term “domestic regulation” refers to any generally applicable measure
that may have the potential to adversely affect the provision of trade in services for which a Member State
has undertaken specific obligations.  See GATS, supra note 13, art. VI(1) (“In sectors where specific
commitments are undertaken, each Member shall ensure that all measures of general application affecting
trade in services are administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner.”).  Note, however, that
some provisions of Article VI, notably Article VI(2) apply to all WTO Members, whether or not they have
scheduled services in a particular sector.  Id. art. VI(2).
114. GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS, supra note 14, at 171.
115. GATS, supra note 13, art. XVI(1) (“With respect to market access through the modes of supply
identified in Article I, each Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other Member
treatment no less favorable than that provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and
specified in its Schedule.”).
116. Id. art. XVI(2)(a):
2. In sectors where market-access commitments are undertaken, the measures which a Member shall
not maintain or adopt either on the basis of a regional subdivision or on the basis of its entire
territory, unless otherwise specified in its Schedule, are defined as:
(a) limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of numerical quotas,
monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an economic needs test . . . .
117. Id. art. XVI(2)(b) (prohibiting Members from placing “limitations on the total value of service
transactions or assets in the form of numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test”).
118. Id. art. XVI(2)(d) (prohibiting Members from placing “limitations on the total number of natural
persons that may be employed in a particular service sector or that a service supplier may employ and who
are necessary for, and directly related to, the supply of a specific service in the form of numerical quotas
or the requirement of an economic needs test”).
119. Id. art. XVII:
1. In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out
qualifications,112 and provisions relating to internal licensing procedures, or
domestic regulations.113
The conditional obligations of the GATS only apply to services sectors
in which a member has undertaken specific commitments.114  The obligations
are two-fold and are found in Part III (“Specific Commitments”).  The first of
these obligations is the prohibition on market access restrictions found in
Article XVI.115  Specifically, this provision prohibits a Member from, for
instance, placing quotas on the number of foreign services suppliers,116
limiting the total value of foreign services transactions,117 or restricting the
number of foreign persons that may be employed in a particular services
sector.118
The second undertaking placed upon scheduled services sectors is found
in the national treatment, or non-discrimination, obligation of Article XVII.119
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therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in
respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favorable than that it
accords to its own like services and service suppliers.
2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph 1 by according to services and service
suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical treatment or formally different
treatment to that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favorable if it
modifies the conditions of competition in favor of services or service suppliers of the Member
compared to like services or service suppliers of any other Member.
120. But because inclusion or exclusion of particular services sectors was the subject of intense
negotiations, some Member States scheduled services sectors that they might otherwise have sought to
protect in order to gain concessions in other sectors and under different agreements.  See, e.g., CONE, supra
note 34, § 2.3.1, at 2:6 to 2:7 (explaining how Japan was persuaded to rejoin the GATS legal services
negotiations in response to intense pressure from the United States and the European Community).
121. GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS, supra note 14, at 199 (Table 3.9) (including
twenty-five developed countries, nineteen developing countries, and four transition economies).  For
individual Member States’ GATS Schedules, see WTO Services Database onLine!, at http://tsdb.wto.org/
wto/wtohomepublic.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2005).
122. See Michael J. Chapman & Paul J. Tauber, Liberalizing International Trade in Legal Services:
A Proposal for an Annex on Legal Services under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 16 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 941, 967 (1995) (analyzing the schedules of WTO Members that submitted legal services
schedules and concluding that “in most cases, the commitments merely preserved existing regulatory
Like the undertaking to provide MFN treatment, the GATS national treatment
provision enforces obligations similar to analogous GATT provisions.  So,
while it seems that the GATS is well on its way to injecting a measure of
discipline into services regulations with tried and true liberalizing concepts,
these undertakings are conditioned by the two other sources of GATS law:
the Members’ Schedules of Specific Commitments and the lists of Article II
exemptions, both of which are addressed in the next section.
2.  Derogating from the GATS:  Schedules of Specific Commitments and
Article II Exemptions
Although “scheduled” services sectors are subject to the more rigorous
market access and national treatment obligations of the GATS, Member States
were free to choose which sectors would be submitted to this enhanced
discipline.120  During the initial Uruguay Round negotiations, forty-eight
Member States decided to submit their legal services sectors to the obligations
inherent in Part III of the GATS.121  Much of the sting of the market access
and national treatment obligations was nonetheless removed by the content of
Member States’ schedules.  Most of the Member States that included legal
services on their Schedules of Specific Commitments did so by listing their
current regulations.122  The legal effect of listing current laws in a GATS
2005] THE GATS AND LAWYER REGULATION 675
measures”).  
123. See GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS, supra note 14, at 171 (“[S]ervice
commitments resemble those in a GATT schedule at least in one very important respect:  they are bindings
which set out the minimum, or worst permissible, treatment of the foreign service or its supplier.”) (second
emphasis added).
124. CONE, supra note 34, at § 2.5.4, 2:32 (“Article XVII will prevent the adoption of any additional
discriminatory measures that were not in effect on December 15, 1993, and not expressly covered by a
Schedule of Specific Commitments or MFN list in a GATS offer in respect of legal services.”).
125. Nevertheless, a Member State may have preserved its right to impose more restrictive regulations
in the future by noting in its schedule that a particular sector or mode of supply is “unbound.”  For a
detailed explanation of the terms used in scheduling commitments and the legal effect of those terms, see
GUIDE TO READING GATS SCHEDULES, supra note 98 (“All commitments in a schedule are bound unless
otherwise specified.  In such a case, where a Member wishes to remain free in a given sector and mode of
supply to introduce or maintain measures inconsistent with market access or national treatment, the
Member has entered in the appropriate space the term UNBOUND.”).
126. See, e.g., CONE, supra note 34, § 2.5.4 (using the term “standstill” to describe scheduled
obligations); Terry, supra note 23, at 1005 (noting that the GATS “grandfathers in” existing sets of
regulations).
127. GATS, supra note 13 (Annex on Article II Exemptions).
128. Id. ¶ 1 (“This Annex specifies the conditions under which a Member, at the entry into force of
this Agreement, is exempted from its obligations under paragraph 1 of Article II.”).
129. See CONE, supra note 34, § 2.4.2, at 2:22 tbl. II (listing GATS members that submitted MFN-
exemption lists in legal services, including:  Brunei Darussalam, China [which was still negotiating WTO
membership at the time], Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Jamaica, Malta, Singapore, Turkey, and Venezuela).
130. For an excellent discussion of the unsettled issues surrounding MFN exemptions, see Terry,
schedule is to effectively exempt those laws from the market access and
national treatment obligations.123  A Member State may not, however, impose
regulations in a scheduled sector that are more onerous than the current
regulations listed in that Member’s GATS schedule.124  This means that,
although few restrictions on trade in legal services were rolled back during the
Uruguay Round, future regulations adopted by scheduling Member States can
be no more restrictive than current regulations.125  That is why GATS is
sometimes said to impose “standstill” or “grandfathered” obligations on
Member States.126
Another means by which Member States were given the opportunity
during the Uruguay Round to mitigate their obligations arising under the
GATS was to submit lists of sectoral exemptions from MFN treatment.127  If
a Member State placed a particular sector on its list, it was no longer obligated
to provide MFN treatment in that sector.128  Although the Article II
exemptions lists must be examined in determining the extent of Member
States’ obligations, very few states included legal services on their respective
Article II exemptions list.129  Therefore, a fuller treatment of the issues
surrounding these exemptions is beyond the scope of this Comment.130
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supra note 23, at 1003-04.
131. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (reporting that forty-eight Member States listed legal
services on their Schedules of Specific Commitments).
132. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
134. Terry, supra note 23, at 1085 (“[T]echnically, the GATS has no impact on U.S. lawyer
regulations insofar as they govern U.S. lawyers.”).
135. See id. (“Is it possible . . . that the GATS might indirectly affect domestic lawyer regulation?
In my view, the answer is yes, there is such a possibility, which is one reason why I think those interested
only in domestic law of lawyering issues should monitor the GATS 2000 negotiations.”).
In summary, in order to determine a Member State’s GATS undertakings
in respect of legal services, or any other services sector, one must look to three
sources of GATS obligations:  (1) the unconditional commitments to which
all WTO Members are subject, found mostly in Part II of the GATS
framework agreement; (2) the commitments found in Member States’
Schedules of Specific Commitments to which the market access and national
treatment obligations of Part III apply; and (3) the MFN exemptions lists
submitted during the Uruguay Round negotiations, which excuse Members
from granting MFN treatment in specified services sectors.
B.  The GATS and the Possibility of “Reverse Discrimination”
As noted above, during the Uruguay Round negotiations that ultimately
led to the adoption of the GATS, WTO Member States were free to choose
which of their services sectors would be covered by the new Agreement.131
By listing current laws regarding the legal services sector on their respective
Schedules of Specific Commitments, as the United States and most Member
States did, WTO Member States are permitted to continue applying lawyer
licensing regulations that are otherwise inconsistent with GATS obligations.132
This means that even though the GATS may, as a result of the ongoing legal
services negotiations,133 exert a substantial influence on lawyer regulation in
the future, the Agreement currently imposes few substantive limitations on a
Member State’s ability to restrict access to domestic legal markets and has no
impact on the way that U.S. lawyers are regulated today.134
Nevertheless, Professor Laurel Terry has expressed the concern that the
GATS may one day exert a profound influence on the way that all U.S.
lawyers are regulated, even lawyers engaged exclusively in domestic
practice.135  She worries that in the give-and-take of future services
negotiations, U.S. trade negotiators may be willing to grant foreign lawyers
greater multijurisdictional practice rights than those enjoyed by U.S. lawyers.
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136. This concern has been well-articulated by Professor Terry:
Imagine that because of the GATS, among other reasons, a U.S. jurisdiction permits foreign lawyers
who have not attended ABA-accredited law schools to practice law in that jurisdiction.  What
happens to a licensed U.S. lawyer from California who did not attend an ABA-accredited school?
Will the jurisdiction continue to deny admission to the California lawyer, even though it permits the
foreign lawyer to practice?  I suspect that sooner or later, pressure will be brought to avoid this type
of discrimination.
Hence, I predict that the GATS’ regulation of foreign lawyers will have an impact on U.S.
lawyer regulations that only apply to U.S. lawyers.  The reason is that if foreign lawyers are granted
greater rights than domestic lawyers, the domestic lawyers will object—sooner or later—to this
“reverse discrimination” and will lobby for equal treatment.
Id. at 1086-87.
137. See Charles W. Wolfram, Sneaking Around in the Legal Profession:  Interjurisdictional
Unauthorized Practice by Transactional Lawyers, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 665, 703 (1995) (“One might regard
the source of most of our present difficulties in interstate law practice to be the failed system of state-by-
state certification of lawyers.  And, to be sure, the ‘solution’ that one hears referred to most often is a
‘national bar.’”).  See also Marvin Comisky & Philip C. Patterson, The Case for a Federally Created
National Bar by Rule or by Legislation, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 945 (1982); Eric Williams, A National Bar—Carpe
Diem, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 201 (1996).
138. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 23, at 1072 (“I would not be surprised to see greater federal
regulation of lawyers in the future . . . .”).  But see Roger J. Goebel, The Liberalization of Interstate Legal
Practice in the European Union:  Lessons for the United States?, 34 INT’L LAW. 307 (2000).  In addressing
whether Congress could enact legislation requiring states to recognize pro hac vice admission as a right of
clients and/or out-of-state counsel instead of a court-granted privilege, Professor Goebel opined that
“[c]ongressional legislation is out of the question—Congress’s legislative power under the Commerce
Clause to deal with a subject so closely related to state courts is quite dubious and political realities rule any
such law out.”  Id. at 338.  Professor Terry has questioned whether Professor Goebel’s analysis would apply
outside the pro hac vice context and where Congress chooses to regulate lawyers.  See Terry, supra note
23, at 1072 n.261.
This, in turn, could lead to calls from the organized bar to grant U.S. lawyers
greater multijurisdictional practice rights.136  Even if the predictions of
Professor Terry come to pass, it is not clear that any change in the
multijurisdictional practice rights of U.S. lawyers will necessarily be effected
in a uniform fashion.  As was shown in Part I of this Comment, states have
taken very different paths in regulating multijurisdictional practice.  Thus,
states would likely respond to the pressures engendered by the GATS in
different ways, perhaps leading to change in some states and the preservation
of the status quo in others.  The difficulty of reconciling the current diversity
of views in the American legal profession on the propriety of various forms
of multijurisdictional practice, and the possibility of greater divergence in the
future, have led some to call for the creation of a truly national bar.137  Even
those commentators who may be unwilling to embrace the idea of a national
bar foresee the possibility of greater federal involvement in the regulation of
lawyers in the future.138
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139. Other constitutional provisions may also bear upon the federal government’s potential power
to regulate lawyers.  No attempt is made here to comprehensively address all such bases.
140. See supra Part II.
141. For a comprehensive treatment of this question and a suggestion that the answer is not as
obvious as it seems, see generally Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 403 (2003).
142. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
143. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation . . . .”);
As is apparent from the discussion in Part I, the regulation of American
lawyers has heretofore been the exclusive province of the states.  Therefore,
if U.S. GATS commitments eventually lead to calls for a federal role in lawyer
regulation, important constitutional questions regarding the federal
government’s ability to encroach upon states’ regulatory prerogatives in this
area will undoubtedly arise.
III.  THE GLOBAL LAWYER AND TH E CONSTITUTION
There are at least three constitutional provisions that are relevant to the
question of whether the federal government could assume a greater role in the
regulation of the legal profession in the United States as a result of the GATS
negotiations.  These include the Treaty Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the
Commerce Clause.139  Each of these provisions is considered below.
A.  The Treaty Power Defined
Thus far, this Comment has been primarily concerned with the ways in
which the GATS may some day indirectly influence the regulation of U.S.
lawyers.140  It has, until now, taken for granted an antecedent question,
namely, whether the federal government may conclude a treaty, like the
GATS, that intrudes upon a regulatory sphere historically reserved to the
states.141  That is, could the federal government dictate the conditions under
which states must permit foreign lawyers to practice law in their respective
jurisdictions?  In order to begin to address this issue, we must first look to the
constitutional provisions that give effect to treaties within the American
federal system.
The first of these provisions expressly grants the treaty-making power to
the President and the Senate:  The President “shall have Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds
of the Senators present concur.”142  The Constitution also makes clear that the
power to make treaties is exclusively reserved to the federal government.143
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art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a
foreign Power . . . .”).
144. Id. art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
145. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority . . . .”).
146. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”).
147. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
148. Id. at 314.  See also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
A treaty is primarily a contract between two or more independent nations . . . . For the infraction of
its provisions a remedy must be sought by the injured party through reclamations upon the other.
When the stipulations are not self-executing they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to
carry them into effect . . . .
Id.
149. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
Treaties are further declared the supreme law of the land, and are thus made
binding on the states through the Supremacy Clause.144  The Constitution also
makes treaties justiciable in federal courts.145  Finally, the Necessary and
Proper Clause enables the Congress to pass legislation needed to implement
and enforce treaties in the U.S. domestic legal system.146
This last power is important because some treaties must be implemented
through legislation before they are cognizable in federal courts.  In Foster v.
Neilson,147 the Supreme Court drew a distinction between “executory”
treaties—which require implementing legislation—and “self-executing”
treaties—which take effect in the domestic legal system upon ratification.
The Court explained:
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land.  It is, consequently, to be
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it
operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision.  But when the terms of the
stipulation import a contract—when either of the parties engages to perform a particular
act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the
legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the court.148
The GATS, which was implemented in the United States by the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act,149 is an example of such an executory treaty.
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act is also interesting, for purposes
here, in a different respect.  In passing this legislation, Congress exhibited
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150. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(A) (2000):
No State law, or the application of such a State law, may be declared invalid as to any person or
circumstance on the ground that the provision or application is inconsistent with any of the Uruguay
Round Agreements, except in an action brought by the United States for the purpose of declaring
such law or application invalid.
151. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
152. See, e.g., Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 (1989); Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S.
274 (1985) (holding that a state admission rule that excluded out-of-state residents from the bar violated
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV).
153. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979).  This case arose out of the prosecution of Hustler
Magazine publisher Larry Flynt in Ohio on state obscenity charges.  Flynt’s lawyers, who were not qualified
to practice in Ohio, were summarily denied admission pro hac vice to defend Flynt.  The lawyers challenged
the denial of admission, alleging violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The
Court held that lawyers wishing to appear before a court pro hac vice do not have an interest in representing
their client that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 438.
significant deference to state law, providing, for example, that no state law
may be declared invalid because it is inconsistent with the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act.150  Nevertheless, this deference may have more to do with
political expediency than legal necessity.  That is to say, it is unclear whether
the Constitution requires this deference to state law.  In order to properly
address this question, one must consider the constraints that the Tenth
Amendment may impose on the Treaty Power.
B.  The Tenth Amendment and the Limits of the Treaty Power
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution provides:  “The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”151  As
demonstrated in Part I above, a power that has historically been reserved to the
states is the power to regulate the practice of law.  Although the Supreme
Court has placed certain constitutional limits on states’ abilities to regulate bar
membership,152 the Court has also acknowledged that:
Since the founding of the Republic, the licensing and regulation of lawyers has been left
exclusively to the States and the District of Columbia within their respective
jurisdictions.  The States prescribe the qualifications for admission to practice and the
standards of professional conduct.  They also are responsible for the discipline of
lawyers.153
Notwithstanding this apparently wide ambit of state regulatory discretion in
bar admission and lawyer discipline, it is unlikely that the Tenth Amendment
would be a hurdle to a federal rule, consistent with U.S. GATS obligations
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154. That is, there may be no legal constraints; however, as Charles Wolfram has pointed out, “the
current political environment is not conducive to [the federal oversight of lawyers].”  Wolfram, supra note
137, at 704.
155. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
156. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 243 (7th ed. 2004).
157. Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-186, 40 Stat. 755 (current version
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2000)).
158. Holland, 252 U.S. at 431.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 432.
161. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 156, at 244.  It is unclear whether the Tenth Amendment
might impose other limitations on, for instance, regulations enacted pursuant to the commerce power.  The
Supreme Court had previously attempted to use the Tenth Amendment to impose some restraint on the
federal commerce power, starting with National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding
that Congress could not subject states to minimum wage and maximum hour requirements under the Fair
Labor Standards Act).  These efforts were apparently abandoned in 1985 in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that municipal operation of a mass-transit
and adopted pursuant to the Treaty Power, that requires states to permit
foreign lawyers to practice in their respective jurisdictions.154
In fact, in the landmark case of Missouri v. Holland,155 the Court, through
Justice Holmes, disclaimed any Tenth Amendment limitation on the Treaty
Power.156  Holland involved a treaty concluded between the United States and
Great Britain for the protection of migratory birds.157  The State of Missouri
brought a bill in equity to prevent a federal game warden from enforcing the
treaty as enacted into federal law.158  Missouri’s central claim was that the
statute was “an unconstitutional interference with the rights reserved to the
States by the Tenth Amendment.”159  The Court rejected this reasoning,
holding that the Treaty Power is not limited by the Tenth Amendment
because:
[B]y Article II, § 2, the power to make treaties is delegated expressly, and by Article VI
treaties made under the authority of the United States, along with the Constitution and
laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, are declared the supreme law of the
land.  If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under
Article I, § 8 as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the
Government.160
What Justice Holmes seems to be saying in Holland is that because the
Constitution specifically delegates the Treaty Power to the federal
government, it does not fall within the category of “powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution,” with which the Tenth Amendment is
concerned, and, therefore, the Tenth Amendment does not constrain the Treaty
Power.161
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system was not a “traditional government function,” and, consequently, the transit system’s public
employees were not exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act).  In Garcia, the Court “overruled prior
caselaw and held that neither the Tenth Amendment nor the structure of the federal system justified
restriction of Congress’ power to apply otherwise valid commercial regulations to state or local
governments.”  NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 156, at 208.  Whether the Court’s renewed interest in the
protection of federalism principles, evidenced in the 1990s in such cases as New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down a federal law that required states to plan for the disposal of and assume
liability for radioactive waste generated within their borders) and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997) (striking down portions of the federal Brady Act that required implementation by local law
enforcement officials), would lead the Court to invalidate the kinds of regulations contemplated in this
Comment, or even whether these regulations would fall within the New York-Printz line of cases, will have
to await further inquiry.  For an argument that the Court’s decisions in the earlier and more restrictive
National League of Cities line of cases would not impede the creation of a national bar, see Comisky &
Patterson, supra note 137, at 967.
162. Holland, 252 U.S. at 432:
It is said that a treaty cannot be valid if it infringes the Constitution, that there are limits, therefore,
to the treaty-making power, and that one such limit is that what an act of Congress could not do
unaided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the States, a treaty cannot do.
163. Id. at 433:
Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution,
while treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority of the United States.  It is open
to question whether the authority of the United States means more than the formal acts prescribed
to make the convention.  We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-
making power; but they must be ascertained in a different way.  It is obvious that there may be
matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could not deal
with but that a treaty followed by such an act could . . . .
164. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957).
An argument advanced by Missouri, but rejected by the Court, was that
Congress should not be able to adopt legislation by way of the Treaty Power
that it would not otherwise be able to adopt pursuant to other constitutional
provisions.  In other words, Congress should not be able to use the Treaty
Power to circumvent the Tenth Amendment.162  Although Justice Holmes’s
response to this argument is rather tortured and suggests that the Treaty Power
is not limited in this way,163 Missouri’s position is now duly recognized.  The
classic modern statement of the limits of the Treaty Power was offered by
Justice Black in Reid v. Covert:  “[N]o agreement with a foreign nation can
confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which
is free from the restraints of the Constitution.”164  Thus, if federal involvement
in lawyer regulation is thought desirable, a basis of congressional authority,
independent of the Treaty Power, must be found to support it.  This is true
even if the federal government only sought regulation of foreign practitioners
consistent with U.S. GATS obligations.  Moreover, if the federal government
were to become involved in the regulation of U.S. practitioners, a basis of
federal regulation must likewise be identified.  Given that multijurisdictional
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165. See Randall S. Thomas et al., Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. REV. 115, 127 (2001) (“Over the past thirty
years, clients have shifted toward asking firms to provide them with more and more services on a broader
and broader geographic basis.  For example, globalization has led many clients to ask firms to handle
increasingly complex transactions across international borders.”).
166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
167. Perhaps the high water mark of the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence came in Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (declaring Wickard
“the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity”).  In Wickard, the
Court held that a farmer’s production of wheat intended solely for home consumption was subject to federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause.  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28.  The Court reasoned that although
Filburn’s wheat production may not itself exert a substantial influence on interstate commerce, the
aggregation of production from those similarly situated could detrimentally affect the market for wheat.
Id.  In commenting on the seemingly unlimited reach of the Commerce Clause in this era, one author has
joked:
If a Martian scholar had consulted an interstellar electronic data base in 1998, he/she/it might have
concluded from Wickard v. Filburn . . . and [its] progeny that Congress could, if it wished, regulate
the prices, hours, and sanitary conditions of a 10-year-old child’s lemonade stand in Illinois on
proof that the lemons came from California and that purchasers of the homemade beverage might
drink less Coca-Cola and Gatorade.
BORIS I. BITTKER, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 5.04, at 5-24
to 5-25 (1999).
168. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 785 (1975) (holding that the provision of legal
services affected interstate commerce in Sherman Act case).  See also Comisky & Patterson, supra note
137, at 964 (“Since the practice of law is ‘trade’ or ‘commerce,’ Congress apparently has the power to
regulate the practice of law insofar as it is in the stream of interstate commerce or insofar as it substantially
affects interstate commerce.”).
practice has arisen, at least in part, from the increasingly broad geographic
demands of business clients,165 the Commerce Clause may be an obvious
potential basis of federal power to regulate both domestic and foreign
practitioners.
C.  The Commerce Clause:  A New Basis for Federal Regulation of
Lawyers?
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides that the
Congress shall have power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”166  If the Commerce
Clause were to serve as a basis for federal regulation of lawyers, a central,
threshold question would be whether the practice of law is “commerce” within
the contemplation of the Constitution.  Under the Supreme Court’s permissive
interpretation of the Commerce Clause as applied from the New Deal era until
the mid-1990s,167 the practice of law, as it exists today, would almost certainly
have fallen within the bounds of the federal commerce power.168  Although the
Court’s recent, more restrictive, Commerce Clause jurisprudence, first
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169. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.  See also Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (striking down
a conviction under the federal arson statute because the residence that was the object of the arson was not
property in or affecting interstate commerce); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking
down a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence contained in the Violence Against
Women Act, in part, because the statute exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
170. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 156, at 198 (“One can read too much into Lopez.  The
Court did not overrule any prior case, and it cited with approval . . . Wickard v. Filburn.”).
171. See BITTKER, supra note 167, § 5.04[A] at 5-26 to 5-27 (“[I]n 1995, for the first time in sixty
years, the Supreme Court struck down a federal statute for going beyond the Commerce Clause’s ‘judicially
enforceable limits.’  The vehicle for this ruling, variously described as a dramatic ‘about face’ and as a mere
‘misstep,’ was United States v. Lopez . . . .”).
172. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
173. Id. at 552.
174. Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
175. Id. at 559.
176. Id.
enunciated in United States v. Lopez,169 may not permit such a definitive
conclusion, it is still possible to construct a convincing argument that
Congress possesses the power to involve itself in the regulation of American
lawyers.170
The Court’s decision in Lopez debunked the supposition that Congress’s
power to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause is unlimited.171  This case
involved the conviction of a Texas twelfth-grader under the federal Gun-Free
Schools Zones Act of 1990, which made it a felony to knowingly possess a
firearm in or near a school zone.172  The Court held that the statute exceeded
congressional power under the Commerce Clause and, accordingly, affirmed
the Fifth Circuit’s reversal of the conviction.173  Writing for a majority of five,
Chief Justice Rehnquist identified the limits of the commerce power, distilled
from prior cases:
[W]e have identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under
its commerce power.  First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce.  Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the
threat may come only from intrastate activities.  Finally, Congress’ commerce authority
includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.174
The Court quickly concluded that the statute could not be sustained under
the first two categories,175 and proceeded to analyze whether the Act
substantially affected interstate commerce, the third category of activity within
the congressional commerce power.176  But the Court seemed to suggest that
the only type of regulation that could fall within this third category was one
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177. Id. at 561.  The Court, however, did not suggest that all non-economic activity is
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.  If the statute, for instance, had been “an essential part of a
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated,” it might have survived constitutional challenge.  Id.
178. See id. at 562.
179. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
180. See MJP REPORT, supra note 1, at 9:
Testimony before the Commission was unanimous in recognizing that lawyers commonly engage
in cross-border legal practice.  Further, there was general consensus that such practice is on the
increase and that this trend is not only inevitable, but also necessary.  The explosion of technology
and the increasing complexity of legal practice have resulted in the need for lawyers to cross state
borders to afford clients competent representation.
181. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
182. See Terry, supra note 23, at 994-95 (“Although U.S. lawyers may not be accustomed to thinking
in these terms, legal services are important not just to clients, society, and lawyers, but are also part of the
world services economy and the U.S. services economy.”).
183. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
184. See Wolfram, supra note 137, at 703 n.125:
It requires an exuberant interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Clause of art. I, § 8, to argue that
that related to economic or commercial activity, and because the Gun-Free
Schools Zones Act was “a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do
with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one
might define those terms,” it could not be upheld under the Commerce
Clause.177
Whether legal practice possesses a “jurisdictional nexus” to interstate
commerce178 sufficient to permit Congress some regulatory control over
American legal professionals may depend upon the form and scope of any
proposed regulation.  But, unlike the gun possession at issue in Lopez, there
is an undeniable interstate component to the practice of law as it is conducted
in the United States today.  In fact, the anxiety engendered by the Birbrower
decision179 and the creation of the MJP Commission, to note just two
examples, were direct results of the increasing prevalence of interstate legal
practice.180
One’s view of whether the practice of law bears a “substantial relation to
interstate commerce”181 is undoubtedly shaped by one’s conception of the
nature of legal practice itself.  Those who see lawyers as multijurisdictional
service providers who represent clients across the country and across the globe
are apt to conceive of the practice of law as an integral part of the interstate
commercial system.182  But, to those who see legal practice as an inherently
local concern that “has nothing to do with ‘commerce,’”183 arguments that
removal of interstate barriers to legal practice are proper objects of the federal
commerce power are unlikely to be persuasive.184  Balancing these competing
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interstate commerce is impacted by providing assistance in a divorce or child custody matter in
another state.  It is true that the often-cited Wickard v. Filburn . . . seems to trivialize any judicial
role in enforcing the commerce clause as a limitation on Congress’s power.  But the traditional,
long-standing power of courts to regulate lawyers would move Congress into regulatory terrain that
it has never so boldly attempted to occupy.
185. See MJP REPORT, supra note 1, at 13 (“The Commission believes that the principle of the
regulation of the practice of law by the state judicial branch of government, which includes jurisdictional
limits on legal practice, should be preserved, and therefore recommends that the ABA affirms its support
for this fundamental principle.”).  See also Wolfram, supra note 137.
views of legal practice will not be easy, but it may be an essential step among
many that will bring the American legal profession closer to crafting a rational
and coherent system of multijurisdictional practice.
IV.  CONCLUSION
Despite an evolving awareness among American bar leaders of the
importance of multijurisdictional legal practice, significant barriers to its
effective realization in the United States remain.  The General Agreement on
Trade in Services might be the catalyst that provokes the dismantlement of
these barriers and leads to greater multijurisdictional practice rights for
American lawyers.  Consequently, all lawyers have an interest in the outcome
of the legal services negotiations and in shaping the profound changes that
may follow in their wake.  At the very least, the GATS negotiations should
provide an occasion for the American legal profession to assess how well our
national practice system serves the needs of clients, the public, and the
profession itself.  It may well be true that the political will to begin removing
interstate practice barriers through an assertion of the federal commerce power
does not yet exist,185 but the organized bar must recognize that the
fundamental changes currently transforming the legal profession call for an
integrated approach to multijurisdictional practice.
